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Faking Like a Woman? Towards an interpretative theorization of sexual pleasure. 
 
 
In this paper we discuss the possibilities for developing a feminist approach to gendered and 
sexual embodiment drawing on a tradition of theorizing bypassed by most previous feminist 
approaches: interactionist sociology (a perspective with roots in early pragmatist philosophy). 
While this tradition has made an impact on studies of sexuality through the work of Gagnon and 
Simon (1974; 2004) and is given partial recognition in some overviews of the sociology of the 
body (Shilling 2003; Synott 1993, Crossley 2001), feminist theorists of the body have largely 
ignored it. This is, perhaps, not surprising since, as has recently been noted, interactionism has 
been subject to a collective theoretical amnesia (Atkinson and Housley 2003, Maines 2001)1. In 
re-evaluating this perspective we will argue that it offers a corrective to the rather abstract, 
asocial theorizations of the body deriving from corporeal feminisms, enabling us to ‘embody 
gender without overwhelming the “sociality” of gender by “corporeality”’(Witz 2000:7). It also 
provides an alternative to the over reliance on the unconscious in feminist psychoanalytic 
approaches. Utilizing interactionism facilitates a conceptualization of sexual pleasure as socially 
mediated, and embodied sexual selves as reflexively constructed and reconstructed. This is not to 
suggest that interactionism offers a complete sociology of the body, or even of the sexual body, 
but it can alert us to aspects of embodiment neglected by other approaches. This paper, then, is 
intended as an exploration of the contribution that a broadly interactionist analysis can make to a 
fully social understanding of embodiment through the example of embodied sexual pleasure. 
 
Sexual encounters arguably engender a greater sense of embodied selfhood than many other 
forms of social interaction, but it must be remembered that they are social. For it is here, 
especially when discussing desire and pleasure, that many theorists too easily fall back on 
understandings of the libidinal as fundamentally a property of the psyche, thus uprooting 
sexuality from social context. In contrast we set out to analyse embodied selves in socially 
located interaction. In focusing on sexual pleasure we consider how desire and pleasure may be 
reflexively understood in the context of everyday/everynight2 sexual practices. Taking orgasm as 
a paradigmatic case, we will argue that even this most individual, ‘private’, ‘physical’ experience is 
always also social. Since our concern is with the experiential gendering of orgasm, and since this 
is particularly evident in heterosexual practice, this will be the focus of this paper. Within 
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heterosexual relations, women’s orgasm has conventionally been seen as more problematic, 
elusive and mysterious than that of men. Building on an earlier analysis (Jackson and Scott 2001) 
we will explore the relationship between such representations and the lived experience of 
orgasm, interrogating the ways in which ‘faked’ and ‘authentic’ orgasms are socially constructed 
within interactional settings.  
 
Sexual bodies are, of course, also gendered bodies: sexual desires and identities are 
conventionally ordered around gender, which is particularly evident in relation to heterosexual 
encounters. Heterosexual sex, indeed the very definition of the ‘sex act’, is premised on socially 
constituted bodily difference, and heterosexual desire and pleasure are generally both represented 
and experientially understood in terms of gender polarity. Before going any further, therefore, we 
need to define more carefully the way in which the terms gender and sexuality are being used 
here. We will then move on to raise some general points about the conceptualization of gendered 
and sexual embodiment and what we take to be a distinctively sociological approach to ‘pleasures 
of the flesh’, before concentrating more specifically on orgasm.   
 
 
Gender, Sexuality and Sociality 
 
Much recent social theory, influenced by poststructuralism, treats gender and sexuality as 
constituted through language, discourse.3 In many respects poststructuralism is congruent with 
an interactionist position as both perspectives conceptualise meaning as fluid, flexible and 
multivalent and neither posit gender and sexuality as objects existing prior to the meanings 
invested in them.  The interactionist tradition, along with other interpretive sociologies, however, 
attends to aspects of meaning-making not generally emphasised by post structuralists: in 
particular those meanings intersubjectively produced by active agents in the course of everyday 
social practices (see Gagnon 2004: 276). The effects of language and discourse are therefore seen 
as mediated through the local production of meaning and ‘people’s intentions to mean’ (Smith 
1999:98-99). What we are particularly concerned with here is the meaningful social reality of 
embodied sexual encounters constituted not only through discourse but also through the meaning-
making emergent from, and negotiated within, situated everyday interaction. It is the focus on 
the social as founded upon interaction and intersubjectivity that gives interactionism its purchase 
on embodied sexuality. While there is more to the social than interaction (see Jackson 2006), it is 
impossible to envision the social without the everyday interaction through which it is lived.   
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 Following Gagnon and Simon (1974) we are treating gender and sexuality as analytically distinct 
although empirically interrelated (see also Jackson1999; Jackson and Scott 2001a). In our analysis 
gender refers to the social division and distinction between women and men whereas sexuality 
denotes what is socially defined as of erotic significance.  In maintaining the distinction between 
gender and sexuality we view so-called ‘sex differences’ as already gendered and therefore 
properly ‘gender’ – reserving the terms sex and sexuality for the erotic.  The recognition of 
bodily differences between women and men (on which normative heterosexuality depends) is 
always a social act (Kessler and McKenna 1978). It is social gender that enables us to ‘see’ 
biological sex as significant in that gender division ‘transforms an anatomical difference (which is 
itself devoid of significance) into a relevant distinction for social practice’ (Delphy 1984: 144) – 
including, of course, sexual practice. However in some feminist theorizing of the body the 
contestation of the sex-gender distinction is resolved through a different move, by abandoning 
gender and returning to sex.  The most influential variant of this within studies of sexuality is 
Foucault’s sex/sexuality formulation whereby the apparatus of sexuality produces sex by 
ordering ‘the body, the sexual organs, pleasures, kinships relations, interpersonal relations’ 
(1980:210).   
 
Taking her cue from Foucault Elizabeth Grosz defines ‘sex’ as referring ‘to the domain of sexual 
difference, to questions of the morphologies of bodies’ (her emphasis) as distinct from sexuality – 
erotic desires, pleasures and practices. She maintains that the term ‘gender’ is redundant because 
everything it designates is ‘covered by the integration of and sometimes the discord between 
sexuality and sex’ (1995a:213). Grosz’s line of argument risks conflating social differences 
between women and men with bodily difference. This, as Anne Witz (2000:8) points out, 
bequeaths us an impoverished concept of gender from which the social disappears4. A more 
sociologically informed analysis, as Witz goes on to elaborate, allows us to understand gender 
not as ‘variations on the theme of “sex” but as a complex set of social relations which defy 
reduction to “sex”, whether this is defined in naturalistic or social constructionist terms’ 
(2000:9).5  We feel it is important to retain a term capable of designating more than bodily sex 
differences and which is able to encompass the wider socially ordered character of male-female 
relations such as gendered divisions of labour. Such aspects of gender are not particularly 
relevant to the intellectual project of theorists such as Grosz and may, indeed, seem distant from 
bodies and sexuality. We, however, would wish to emphasise that all interaction is embodied and 
gendered and that sexual relations always occur within a nexus of wider social relations. This is 
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particularly important in understanding the asymmetries and inequalities entailed in heterosexual 
sexual relations (see Jackson 2006; Jackson and Scott; 2004). 
 
Distinguishing between gender as social division and sexuality as the social definition, 
construction and ordering of the erotic avoids conceptual slippage between ‘sex’ as differences 
between men and women and ‘sex’ as an erotic activity (c.f. Sedgwick 1991 28-29). ‘Sexuality’ 
then defines a sphere of social life, ‘sex’ an embodied activity within that sphere and ‘sexual’ 
qualifies activities, practices, emotions, sensations and representations as belonging to or of 
relevance to that sphere. It can then be recognized that all that goes on within the sexual sphere 
is gendered, but that this occurs through complex processes which require investigation rather 
than being taken as pre-given. We will now go on to consider how such an investigation might 
be pursued in relation to the ways in which heterosexual sexuality maps onto and is played out 
through gendered bodies.  
 
Sexual embodiment as social embodiment 
 
If we understand sexual relations as social relations, then this entails thinking about the varied 
ways in which bodies and embodiment might figure in sexual encounters. First the body can be 
an object of desire or of another’s sexual acts; second, the embodied self is capable of sensual 
awareness of another – this is a self who sees, smells, touches;  third the embodied self also has 
the capacity to feel the emotions and sensations associated with erotic desire and sensual 
pleasure. The body in the first sense, the sexualized body, is often a passive body, looked at or 
acted upon; a sexual body implies more, a body in the second and third senses is a body both 
active and feeling. In all of these three senses a body can never be just a body abstracted from 
mind, self and social context. 
 
In making these distinctions we are drawing on Gesa Lindemann's (1997) categories: the 
objectified, experiencing and experienced body. Here we rework these categories as objectified, 
sensory and sensate embodiment in order to emphasize social embodiment as process rather 
than structure, in which the reflexive capacities of the self are implicated (Mead, 1934). This 
facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the sociality of the body. Objectified embodiment 
refers to bodies as perceptible entities in physical and social space. In terms of sexuality this does 
not mean seeing bodies as sexual objects; rather it is to recognize that bodies can be perceived as 
objects of desire and can also be acted upon sexually. Sensory embodiment is the capacity to 
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experience our surroundings through sight, hearing, taste, touch, which, in sexual terms, enables 
us to perceive another’s embodiment as sexual. Sensate embodiment is the means through which 
we feel pleasure and pain, and more broadly experience our bodies as a part of our being – and, 
of course, a heightened awareness of our capacity to feel emotion and sensation is part of what 
defines a social situation as potentially sexual. Sensory and sensate embodiment together, 
therefore, constitute what we might be called lived or experiential embodiment (c.f. Williams and 
Bendelow 1998). Embodiment in all three senses has a physical materiality (a body will bleed 
when it is cut and can be seen to bleed and an embodied individual feels the pain of the wound 
and experiences that pain as her own), but embodiment it is not simply a physical given: each 
aspect of it is always already social and intermeshed in complex relations of reciprocal effectivity 
with each other aspect.  
 
Objectified embodiment, though materially ‘there’ in physical and social space is not simply a 
natural state, but one marked by social place and history, coded by gender, class, context and 
happenstance rendering an embodied manifestation recognizable as a particular person or a 
member of a particular social category (e.g. as a man or a woman). As Nick Crossley notes, 
bodies ‘are classified from birth and even before’ and ‘this process of categorization … effects a 
“social magic”’ (2001: 151). This ‘marking’ of bodies is not simply symbolic – investing them 
with signifiers of, for example, class, gender and ethinicity – but also material in that social 
location and biographical events leave physical traces on bodies (e.g. effects of diet, environment, 
physical and emotional labour)(Morgan and Scott 1993) as well as endowing us with a particular 
bodily hexis (Bourdieu 1992).  
 
As embodied beings we are ‘reversible’. We not only perceive but are perceived: we can 
be seen, touched, heard, smelled and tasted. And, as a consequence, we can be classified 
according to our perceptible qualities, or at least according to those perceptible qualities 
deemed salient within the forms of classification that have been constructed historically 
within our societies. (Crossley 2001: 150-151) 
 
This categorization, and the recognition on which it is based, is itself a social act, an act of 
decoding that enables us to ‘see’ a particular body as someone we know or as classed or 
gendered. Furthermore, our bodies can be objects to ourselves – such self-reflexivity is a central 
premise of interactionism (Mead1934), which not only enables each person to see her/his body 
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as object, but also to imagine how it is seen by another and to envisage engagement with the 
embodied actions of others.  
 
Here we are moving on to the second sense of embodiment, sensory embodiment, the capacity 
for sensory perception. But we do not perceive by physical sense alone: the work of perception is 
accomplished by an embodied self, someone who not only has ‘sense organs’ but is capable of 
active, reflexive sense-making by virtue of her social being, social location and personal biography. 
For example, think of what is required to enable sensual perception of another as a lover. To 
‘see’ another’s (objectified) body as sexual requires interpretive work – even the simple 
identification of another as of a gender appropriate to our preferences is, as ethnomethodologists 
have demonstrated, a practical accomplishment (Garfinkel 1967; West and Zimmerman 1987). 
Further, to read another’s body as desirable necessitates the mobilization of appropriate scripts 
and an ability to locate ourselves and the other within them (Gagnon and Simon 1974).  
 
Finally, embodiment in our third sense, sensate embodiment, does not just produce sensations 
ready to be ‘felt’; we interpret them and in so doing give them meaning. ‘Feeling’ requires a 
reflexive engagement with our own embodied state – whether immediate and conscious sense-
making or habitual recognition based on past experience. As G H Mead puts it ‘unordered 
sensuous content’ only ‘becomes experience when it is placed within the forms of understanding’ 
(1964: 530): only when it is reflexively processed does it enter into the self’s ‘heritage of 
experience’ (Mead: 1934: 172). To feel desire and pleasure requires not just a sensate body, a 
body physically able to feel, but an embodied decoding of sensation (being caressed) and internal 
states (bodily signifiers of arousal) as sexually significant: ‘the sources of arousal, passion or 
excitement (the recognition of a sexual possibility)… derive from a complicated set of layered 
symbolic meanings’ (Gagnon and Simon 1974: 23). 
 
While objectified, sensory and sensate embodiment may be distinguished from each other 
analytically, in everyday sexual life they are inextricably intermeshed. Objectified embodiment, 
while it is the mode through which we identify and experience bodies as having facticity, does 
not imply that bodies are simply there to be defined as sexual: how they are sexualized (for 
example, divided into erogenous zones) may well affect how bodily acts and sensations are 
perceived, ordered and experienced in the progress of a sexual encounter: which body parts are 
brought into play, which stimuli are interpreted as pleasure. Similarly the sexual experiences we 
have may then act back upon the way objectified embodiment is perceived. Thus, for instance, a 
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woman’s first sexual encounter with a penis may reorder her perception of the male body. 
Sensory and sensate embodiment – bodily sensual perception and feelings – are particularly 
closely linked through our lived embodiment. We can explore and thus experience another’s 
body through our senses – sight, smell, touch – while at the same time experiencing (feeling) 
sexual sensation in our own bodies. Thus the physical contact of sex entails simultaneous 
touching and feeling. What makes this recognizable as erotic is first, as we have already indicated, 
each individual’s understanding of embodied experience and second, the interaction itself. Sexual 
interaction creates a potentially6 shared sense of erotic meaning, a sense of a particular 
configuration of interacting bodies as erotic and thus the possibility of another level of 
reflexively embodied sexual meaning. 
 
While this reflexive interplay is crucial to understanding our own experiences of the sexual and 
how they become felt and embodied, we must always be wary of presupposing these links when 
observing others’ bodies. We cannot simply read off properties of another’s lived (sensory and 
sensate) embodiment from their objectified embodiment, deduce what another person is feeling 
from the body we see. For example, an erect penis is conventionally read as an unproblematic 
signifier of male desire, but it may not have such meaning to the man experiencing it. A woman 
might be perceived as ‘sexy’, read as sexual, when she is not actually feeling sexual (Jackson & 
Scott 2001a); she may consciously project herself as sexy without feeling desire (Tolman 2002). 
 
The view of embodiment being advanced here does not deny the physical materiality of bodies – 
rather it emphasizes that bodies are not meaningful in themselves. All of us are embodied within 
social contexts, which profoundly affect how we experience our own and others’ bodies. 
Interpreting bodies as sexual requires a set of culturally acquired competencies as does 
experiencing our own lived bodies as sexual. When we engage in sex  with another person it is 
not about abstract bodies meeting  in asocial space, but embodied social beings interacting in a 
social context, bringing with them a good deal of cultural and biographical baggage.  
 
Pre-social and supra-social fictions 
 
That sexuality is not a natural phenomenon has become almost axiomatic within critical 
academic thought, if not always in commonsense thinking. Sociologists have become used to 
contesting biological forms of essentialism, where sexuality is seen as an inherent property of the 
human organism in which bodily sexual gratification is driven by biological imperatives.7  Here 
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sexuality is conceptualized as pre-social, capable of modification by social mores but nonetheless 
as essentially prior to the social. Yet alongside this, there are other common-sense 
understandings of sexuality, whereby it is invested with magical, mystical and romantic 
properties, associated with ideas of transcendence, the belief that it can somehow raise us above 
the mundane realities of our quotidian existence. Sexuality becomes, in this sense, supra-social, 
beyond the social. In everyday terms these two frequently overlap, so that sex can paradoxically 
be seen both as an expression of humanity’s animal nature and a means by which individuals can 
discover transcendental ‘truths’ about themselves.  
 
Among many social and cultural theorists pre-social conceptualizations of the sexual are 
routinely dismissed as essentialist. Supra-social imagery, however, is less easily contested. There 
are forms of theory that lend themselves to a view of desire itself as outside the social, as 
resistant to, and potentially subversive of, the social ordering of sexuality.  For example in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis desire, figured as a consequence of lack, is irreducible to need, in that it 
cannot be easily satisfied (see Rose 1982). In recent years Deleuzian thinking has to some extent 
displaced this notion with a reconceptualisation of desire as ‘positive, and associated with 
transformative production and experimentation’ (Potts 2004: 18). Those who draw on such 
perspectives are by no means essentialists and are poles apart from those who view desire as a 
product of biological imperatives; rather, desire is here envisaged as in excess of the functional 
requirements of bodily and species needs and irreducible to physiological processes. It is in this 
idea of desire as potentially uncontainable by normative sexuality that we detect a supra-social 
imaginary that risks abstracting desire from both physical and social location. For Elizabeth 
Grosz, for example, desire is far more than an interaction between lovers or an exchange of 
physical intimacies: 
 
Erotic desire…is a mode of surface contact with things and substances, with a world, 
that engenders and induces transformations, intensifications, a becoming something 
other. Not simply a rise and fall, a waxing and waning, but movement, processes, 
transformations. That is what constitutes the appeal and power of desire, its capacity to 
shake up, rearrange, reorganise the body’s forms and substances, to make subject and 
body as such into something else, something other than what they are habitually… desire 
need not, indeed commonly does not, culminate in sexual intercourse but in production 
… the production of sensations never felt, alignments never thought energies never 
tapped, regions never known (1995b: 294-5) 
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 The appeal of this conceptualization of desire is that it resonates with feminists’ investment in 
challenging the conventional sexual order and therefore championing forms of desire that push 
at the boundaries of normativity. Thus Annie Potts (2000) draws on Grosz’s depiction of desire 
as a means of disrupting the mechanistic, end driven model of the sexual encounter as a ‘natural’ 
sequence ending in orgasm. Potts takes ‘the deconstructive implications of desire’ as potentially 
destabilizing the meaning of sex and orgasm in pursuit of a different form of sex in which 
orgasm is ‘neither the target nor the non-target of sex’ (2000: 70).  We have some sympathy with 
this project and are on record as seeking to de-privilege a monolithic notion of (hetero)sex, with 
orgasm as end point and high point (Jackson and Scott 1997). However, the notion of desire as a 
means through which this might be achieved is problematic in that desire, for us, cannot be 
envisaged as floating free of the social: it will always be social and therefore meaningful, 
meaningful and therefore social. We would contend that locating desire as supra-social is no 
more tenable than positing instinctual drives as pre-social.  
 
Embodied desires and practices cannot be disembedded from the social – if changing 
conceptualizations do help to effect change in embodied practices it is as part of social life not as 
an escape from it (Cohen and Taylor 1978, 1992). There can be no ‘revolutionary’, ‘productive’, 
disruptive or subversive desire beyond the social. Human sexuality is not fixed, but it is both 
reproduced and transformed as an ongoing accomplishment of everyday practices within wider 
social relations.  
 
The ‘mystery’ of the female orgasm 
 
A common manifestation of supra-social thinking on the sexual, in both its commonsense and 
academic forms, is the assumption that women’s pleasure is particularly mysterious, unknowable 
or unrepresentable. Women’s orgasm has conventionally been seen as less physical than that of 
men and less susceptible to medical intervention (Clark 1993), a ‘problem’ currently bedevilling 
pharmaceutical companies in the race to find a female equivalent of Viagra. There is also a strong 
tradition of treating women's pleasure as mysterious and unrepresentable in psychoanalysis, 
perhaps the best known example of which is Lacan's notion of a female jouissance beyond the 
phallus, beyond language, beyond - even - knowledge of those experiencing it.  Yet, as Lacan 
himself appears to understand, women’s pleasure is commonly represented as in his own 
depiction of Bernini’s statue of the medieval mystic, Teresa of Avila: ‘You only have to go and 
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look at Bernini's statue in Rome to understand immediately that she is coming, there is no doubt 
about it.’ (1982:147) 
 
The point here is not to critique psychoanalysis in general or Lacan in particular, but to draw 
attention to a common theme in cultural understandings of women’s sexuality.8 Making 
connections between sexual and religious ecstasy is by no means peculiar to Lacan and 
frequently informs readings of Bernini’s statue.9 The reason why he and others can immediately 
see that she is coming is by interpreting a particular set of cultural insignia manifested not by a 
material embodied woman, but by a representation of a woman in a state of ecstasy: the head 
thrown back, the eyes closed, the lips parted etc. What we have here are the conventions by 
which female ecstasy is represented, which may or may not bear any relation to women’s 
embodied experience of orgasm. As we have cautioned earlier we cannot read off the 
characteristics of sensory and sensate embodiment from the visible signs that constitute 
objectified embodiment even in the case of a material living person. Moreover, we should be 
wary of applying current constructions of sexuality to earlier representations, which could, in the 
context of their time, have had quite other meanings. 
 
We would suggest that a sociological understanding of women's pleasure and its representation 
should recognise the ways in which representations enter into everyday interaction.  Today’s  
conventional depictions of women’s pleasure and orgasm in many respects share a cultural 
history with Lacan’s reading of Bernini, but now especially through the medium of film, 
combining sound effects with visual imagery.10 These conventional representations have real 
effects - not least in that they provide women with everyday knowledge of how to fake an 
orgasm and perhaps how to have a convincingly ‘authentic’ one: how to signal an internal 
embodied event to a partner and how to understand a partner’s responses as an orgasm. This 
performance, which is highly gendered, may be what makes an orgasm ‘real’ in sexual 
interactions. 
 
 
The gendering of orgasm 
 
We are interested then in the gendered meanings of orgasm, meanings which cannot be anything 
other than social. Even writers otherwise committed to an anti essentialist stance often seem to 
assume, where arousal and orgasm are concerned, that meaning is inherent in bodily responses. 
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Pasi Falk's (1994) discussion of pornography is a case in point. Male bodies, he tells us, 
evidentially signify arousal/pleasure through erection and ejaculation. Here the ‘lack’ of physical 
signs in women is represented as problematic: women’s bodies simply cannot be read in the way 
male bodies can, hence the necessity for women in pornographic movies to ‘act’ desire and 
pleasure. Falk thus reduces male sexuality to an unproblematic bodily reflex – to which some 
theorists of masculinity and male sexuality might object. Emmanuel Reynaud (1983), for 
example, delivers an acerbic critique of the ‘myth of the phallic orgasm’. ‘Ejaculation in itself has 
little to do with sensual pleasure’ he says and more to do with concretizing men’s power. For 
Reynaud male sexuality is more a product of men’s social location as the dominant gender than 
of their bodily capacities (1983:61): 
 
 Man is afraid of letting himself go. He does not abandon himself to his pleasure; he 
confines it within the limits of his penis…he rarely lets himself be carried away by his 
own sensuality. He centres it on his penis without feeling that his whole body is totally 
sexualised. (Reynaud 1973:62) 
 
While this may read as a rather essentializing account of masculinity it does suggest that male 
desire and pleasure may be more problematic than Falk assumes.  That such significance is 
accorded to a small quantity of body fluid – with the consequent equation of coming and ‘cum’ – 
is surely a consequence of its social definition rather than any essential properties. Susan Bordo 
offers an alternative explanation for the focus on female orgasm in representations of sex, one 
more in keeping with Reynaud’s view that men are more concerned with demonstrating potency 
than pleasure. A man’s virility is represented as control of both his own and his partner’s sexual 
response: ‘She’s transported to another world; he’s the pilot of the ship that takes her there’ 
(Bordo 1999:191). 
 
 While Bordo is critical of traditional representations of male sexuality, she nonetheless assumes 
that men’s bodies unproblematically signify arousal, that arousal can simply be read off from the 
erect penis. She is not alone among feminist writers in reducing the meaning of male sexuality to 
physiological responses.  It is not unusual for feminists to understand the conventional sequence 
of heterosex – dictated by his erection and his orgasm – as intrinsically male-defined rather than 
socially ordered. Hence the assumption that the male definition of orgasm is somehow built into 
the male body. Describing models such as the Masters and Johnson sexual response cycle 
(arousal, plateau, orgasm, resolution) Annie Potts comments: ‘This tumescence and 
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detumescence deemed to be characteristic of the “natural” course of sex is inevitably more 
consistent with a male (penis)-centred version of sexual experience’ (Potts 2000: 61). Why should 
this be so? Certainly we should question the accepted syntax of sex – foreplay followed by 
penetration leading to (his) orgasm. But questioning the prioritization of penetration in this 
‘sexual sentence’ (Scott and Freeman 1995) need not entail arguing that penetration per se is 
intrinsically ‘male’ or simply about producing male orgasm. It is even more difficult to see why 
orgasm itself, or physiological responses preceding or following from it, are intrinsically male, 
somehow given by possession of a penis. The current masculine meanings associated with the 
‘sexual sentence’ and orgasm itself are not given by male sexual anatomy and physiology, but are 
the product of culturally ordered meanings embedded in particular social practices. The 
meanings of orgasm derive from social, not biological contexts.  
 
As we said earlier, we are not denying the physicality of bodies. But physiologically the bodily 
responses which are understood to constitute orgasm are simply part of a reflex action, in 
themselves, of no more social significance than any other reflex. Physical reflexes, including 
those associated with orgasm, happen in women's, as well as men’s, bodies. Women, however, 
rarely describe orgasm in purely physical terms – it has become bound up with mystical ideas of 
ecstasy and transcendence and associated with the romantic trappings of love and intimacy 
(Potts 2000; Roberts et al. 1995).  Women may thus unwittingly collude in the social definition of 
their orgasms as somehow more mysterious than those of men. This mystery is, then, a widely 
believed social fiction with real effects – and, to quote an old sociological maxim, if something is 
defined as real it is real in its consequences (Thomas 1923).  
 
Doing Orgasm 
 
Social definitions of male and female orgasm, then, have real consequences for everyday 
heterosexual practices. Qualitative research on the meanings of orgasm suggests, for example, 
because women’s orgasms are not deemed self-evident women are required to make a show of it, 
to produce a spectacular and noisy performance (Potts 2000; Roberts et al. 1995) Moreover, 
because orgasm is understood as the ‘peak’ of sexual experience, (Potts 2000), its absence 
signifies a failed or incomplete sexual event, one which has not reached its proper conclusion: 
the sexual sentence has no full stop! In heterosexual intercourse, male orgasm is assumed to be 
virtually inevitable, whereas that of a woman requires male work and skill; thus a woman’s 
spectacular demonstration of orgasm affirms her partner’s sexual expertise. ‘The demand for 
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noise… indicates that heterosexuality becomes an economy in which the woman’s orgasm is 
exchanged for the man’s work’ (Roberts et al. 1995: 528; see also Jackson and Scott 1987). 
Absence of orgasm in a woman may represent her own sexual failings, but may also reflect on 
her partner’s ‘flawed’ technique, hence the pressure on her to reassure him, to provide evidence 
of her orgasm or, if necessary to fake it. This is also an example of the embeddedness of sexual 
activity in everyday sociality: women’s reassurance of their partners is part of the ‘emotion work’ 
of maintaining a heterosexual relationship (see Duncombe and Marsden 1993) and conforms to 
the more general expectation that women will ‘feed egos and tend wounds’ (Bartky 1990).  
 
There are a series of a paradoxes here: the male performance ethic creates a demand that women 
enact a convincing performance of orgasm; the idea of women as passive recipients of male 
expertise requires an active use of ‘their minds in order to perform (being) the body’ (Roberts 
1995: 530); a woman’s ‘appreciation’ of male sexual work requires considerable emotional labour 
to produce a performance that appears authentic, that provides an appropriate affirmation of her 
partner’s prowess.11 Dealing with these paradoxes requires considerable interpretive work, 
reading a male partner’s responses and producing a finely judged performance of orgasm. For, as 
Roberts et al. point out, an overly theatrical and extravagant display is likely to be read as faked; 
subtler performances are more convincing. They suggest that women are expert at this deception 
in that most women in their sample admitted faking it on occasion, while few of the men 
thought that they had ever been with a partner who had faked. 
If a woman feels the need to reassure her male partner of the adequacy of his performance, that 
felt need will persist whether or not she ‘really’ experiences orgasm. Similar performances may 
thus accompany both ‘faked’ and ‘authentic’ orgasms.  The cultural availability of these 
‘canonical orgasmic insignia’ (DeNora 1997: 44) is what makes such performances possible and 
available to be read as ‘authentic’ orgasm.  Tia DeNora is interested, as we are, in how cultural 
resources and various forms of representation ‘actually “get into” and inform real lines of erotic 
conduct’ (1997: 44). The issue then becomes how orgasm is practically accomplished, how it is 
embodied, how it is manifested and reworked through social practice. This entails a reflexive 
process through which our embodied selves are continually constructed and reconstructed, 
through making sense of the social and cultural world available to us, in interaction with others. 
 
If orgasm is a practical accomplishment in this sense, then at some stage we must acquire the 
cultural competencies that enable us to ‘know’ what it is, to ‘recognize’ it in ourselves and others. 
As we pointed out earlier ‘feeling’ requires reflexive decoding of our own sensate embodiment. 
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We would suggest that we have to learn to recognize an orgasm and also learn its cultural 
definitions. This resonates with one of the classics of the interactionist tradition, Howard 
Becker’s study of marijuana users. Becker (1963) argues that while it necessary to use marijuana 
‘properly’ in order to get high, this is not sufficient and users must learn to relate their 
‘symptoms’ not only to the action of the drug, but also to deem them comparable to the 
‘symptoms’ experienced by other users and thus appropriate. This process is summed up neatly 
by one of Becker’s respondents: ‘I heard little remarks that were made by other people. 
Somebody said, “my legs are rubbery”, I was very attentively listening for all these cues for what 
I was supposed to feel like’ (Becker 1963: 50). What Becker is suggesting is that users must learn 
to define the effects of drugs as pleasurable. Thus a three-stage process is involved: learning to 
use the drug, learning to perceive its effects and learning to define them as pleasurable. We 
would suggest that a similar process is entailed in learning to ‘do’ orgasm. 
 
Orgasm, however, unlike getting high is not usually a collective experience; indeed there is a lack 
of everyday discussion of ‘doing’ sex and particularly of sexual pleasure.  The most evident 
source from which it is possible to learn how to perceive its effects and come to define them as 
pleasurable is the media. As Susan Bordo points out ‘We learn what sexual arousal looks and 
sounds like from the movies, and – as with any other language – we pick up the grammar and 
syntax without being aware of it’ (Bordo 1999: 65).  These codes are highly conventionalized, 
learned by actors from other actors. Jill Lewis discusses an actor’s account of this process 
wherein: ‘She had an image of generations of actors all imitating how they had seen sex/love 
represented in other plays or films or books, conjuring up stereotypical postures, expected 
gestures’ (Lewis 1997: 241). These representations are culturally available to us all as a means of 
‘making sense’ of our own embodied sensations and of finding ways to communicate desire and 
pleasure in intimate interaction. There is some evidence that such images have long been drawn 
on, by young people, in learning to ‘do sex’ (Blumer 1943; Christian-Smith 1991; Thomson and 
Scott 1991; Illouz 1997). Thus media representations of sex do not affect the lived body directly; 
their effects are mediated through the interactional contexts in which we ‘do’ sex and the 
reflexive processes whereby we interpret our own bodily responses and ‘read’ those of a lover. It 
is only then that cultural meanings of sex become part of our lived embodiment.  
For orgasm to become a ‘real’ experience, for a simple reflex to be understood as an erotically 
significant event, requires far more than the technical know-how necessary to set off the 
appropriate physiological response. As Annie Potts’s (2000) data suggests, the meanings of 
orgasm are extremely complex for both women and men, relying on particular interpretations of 
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it as the ultimate or peak sexual experience. It is this which allows orgasm to become imbued 
with all manner of mystical and emotional meanings, which creates a space for the construction 
of specifically gendered understandings of what the experience is.  
This raises the question of what sense orgasm can be said to exist in the absence of such 
meanings. The obvious case here would be a child masturbating to ‘orgasm’ who does not have 
access to the meanings with which it is invested by adults. While the physical sensations may be 
homologous they cannot be assumed to have the same significance. This is precisely because 
children are denied full access to adult means of making sense of the experience as orgasm – it is 
not that children are intrinsically asexual, but a result of the social organisation of childhood and 
sexuality within contemporary culture (Jackson 1982; Jackson and Scott 1997, 1999, 2004). 
Insofar as there are bodily links between these childhood and adult experiences it is only because 
they are retrospectively reinterpreted as ‘the same’.  
We may remember sexual feelings and sensations associated with our own childhood 
activities, but this does not mean that we attached the same significance to them at the 
time, for in recalling our experiences we are interpreting them with the hindsight of adult 
knowledge (Jackson 1982:70) 
Self understanding, sexual or otherwise, can only ever be accomplished, as Mead says, from the 
perspective of the present. We cannot think ourselves back to the child we once were without 
taking the adult of the present moment back with us (Mead 1929, 1932). As Gagnon and Simon 
put it, rather than the past simply determining the present, ‘the present significantly reshapes the 
past as we reconstruct our biographies to bring them into greater congruence with our current 
identities, roles, situations and available vocabularies’ (1974: 13). 
 
Scripting or composing the sexual body 
 
We have suggested elsewhere (Jackson and Scott 2000) that our understanding of sexual 
embodiment might be furthered by returning to Gagnon and Simon’s conceptualization of the 
social construction of sexuality in terms of ‘sexual scripts’ (1974).  Drawing on this 
conceptualisation we are suggesting that orgasm is in many respects scripted. The term ‘scripts’, 
though, has its limitations in that it connotes something fixed. As Gagnon and Simon themselves 
note, the term ‘suggests the conventional dramatic narrative form, which more often than not is 
inappropriate’ (1974: 23). As they point out, even the most conventional erotic sequence (such as 
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the ‘sexual sentence’) ‘derives from a complicated set of layered symbolic meanings’ which might 
not be the same for both participants in the standard heterosexual drama.  
 
Scripts, then, should not be understood as closed texts which lock us into predictable plots and 
roles, but something much more fluid and open, offering opportunities to improvize. Scripts are 
played with, not simply played out; they are open to renegotiation as we take cues from partners 
and make sense of what is happening to them, to us and between us. Gagnon and Simon identify 
three interrelated dimensions of scripting (1974; 2004; Gagnon 2004).12 There are first, ‘cultural 
scenarios’, which we have already discussed in relation to the conventional ways in which 
sexuality is represented in the media. More broadly cultural scenarios or cultural scripting refer to 
the discourses through which the sexual is constituted as an object of knowledge (c.f. Foucault 
1978) and to ‘what the intersubjective culture treats as sexuality’ (Laumann et al. 1994: 6). 
Cultural scenarios provide a generally available stock of cultural knowledge about sexuality; they 
do not determine sexual conduct or experience,  rather they are available to us as resources to 
make sense of our own embodied sexuality.  
 
Secondly, interpersonal or interactional scripting is that which occurs in the intersubjective space 
of sociality, which is negotiated in and emergent from interaction with others. This, of course, 
draws on available cultural scenarios which are reworked through everday sexual practices which 
can then themselves become, within a particular social group, available as ways of ‘doing sex’.13 
In negotiating sexual relationships and activities these wider cultural scenarios are interactionaly 
shaped ‘into scripts for behaviour in specific contexts’ (Simon 1996: 41).  Even if this might 
involve little more than predictable variations on common cultural themes, interpersonal scripts 
are nonetheless locally, interactionally produced by the actors involved.  
 
The third dimension is intrapsychic scripting, consequent on the reflexive self, through which we 
come to ‘a socially based form of mental life’ (Gagnon 2004: 276) constructed from relations 
between self and other(s) as well as through internal conversations with the self.14 We thereby 
reflexively process material from cultural scenarios and interpersonal experience, constructing a 
personal set of sexual scripts through which we make sense of desires and practices which then 
inform both our individual fantasies and our sexual engagements with others. Intrapsychic 
scripting is also the process whereby ‘meaning is attributed to the interior of the body’ (Gagnon 
and Simon 1974: 21) enabling us to make sense of bodily states as sexually significant. Sexual 
feeling does not derive directly from the body, but must be actively interpreted before it 
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becomes incorporated into out sensate embodiment as what arousal or orgasm ‘feels like’.15 
Orgasm, then, is a cultural, interpersonal and intrapsychic construction and not the ultimate truth 
of sex.  
 
The idea of scripting derives from an interactionist tradition and pragmatist philosophical 
foundations in which the self is provisional and always in process; in which meanings are 
emergent, negotiated and renegotiable – but always in the context of the actualities of social life.  
The advantage of this perspective is that it is non-deterministic, in that it allows for fluidity and 
agency, without assuming that we are free to do anything we please or to apply any number of an 
infinite array of meanings to erotic encounters. On the contrary, our practices and the meanings 
informing and emergent from them derive from the cultural resources we have to hand, from the 
social and cultural repertoires and vocabularies and the past biographical experience reflexively 
available to us in the present (Mead 1932). An interactionist perspective presupposes socially 
located bodies in interaction. Even when we are alone, however, we are still social beings (Mead 
1934); hence solo sex, like sex with another, involves a reflexive process whereby cultural 
meanings and social knowledge, shaped and re-shaped throughout our lives, guide both our 
minds (our fantasies) and our hands. 
 
Thus sexual scripts, while always socially situated, are active compositions, not merely pre-
defined guides for action. Elsewhere, extemporizing from DeNora’s work on music and erotic 
agency, we have suggested an alternative metaphor: that of the composition of the sexual self 
and sexual embodiment (De Nora 1997; Jackson and Scott 2001b).  The dual meaning of the 
verb ‘to compose’ and its associated nouns are suggestive of the active composition of narratives 
of embodied selfhood and the enactment of forms of bodily composure necessary for sexual 
interaction. The scripting or composition of sexual encounters is not just about acts, but how we 
make sense of what we feel and thus what we can make intelligible to ourselves as feeling –  both 
emotion and sensation –  and what we can therefore convey to others. The three forms of 
embodiment we outlined at the outset – objectified, sensory and sensate – are here brought into 
complex interplay. Engaging in sexual interaction entails reading, though our sensory 
embodiment, a partner’s (or partners’) embodied sexual composure – their objectified body – for 
imputed signs of their sensate embodiment. At the same time, we are objects of a similar process 
through which they are reading us. Through this interaction each participant can pick up the cues 
for further improvization.  We cannot ‘do sex’ competently without this interactive process and 
the reflexivity this entails. Sexual embodiment requires that we compose ourselves bodily, 
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construct an ongoing sense of embodied self within the intersubjective social space of the sexual 
encounter.  
 
Bodily composure in its sexual and non-sexual forms is of course highly gendered. Iris Marion 
Young, in her well known phenomenological account of women’s embodiment, argued that the 
typical female bodily comportment is a product of situatedness in the social environment and of 
the orientation of the body to the social world. Much of what Young (1990) identifies as the 
specificity of feminine embodiment is posited as being a consequence of women being objects of 
the male gaze and of men’s actions. It could be said that just as a woman learns to ‘throw like a 
girl’ so she later learns to fake like a woman. However this suggests that forms of sexual 
embodiment inevitabley become fixed and habitual. There are of course forms of embodied 
selfhood which are pre reflexive, as Mead (1934) recognizes: acquired habits of being, of bodily 
movement and deportment about which we no longer need to be reflexive (c.f. Bourdieu’s 
[1992] notion of bodily hexis). However, we would suggest that a fixed pre reflexive bodily hexis 
may be less a characteristic of sexual embodiment, in that sexual comportment arises out of 
interaction and is therefore always subject to modification as a result of reflexive accommodation 
to a sexual partner or partners. Hence while sexual interaction in long term couple relationships 
may become tacitly understood and habitual (see for example Duncombe and Marsden 1996), in 
any less routine sexual encounters bodily contact and posture have to be negotiated anew in 
order to reach an accommodation to a different partner or situation.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that sexual practices and experiences have to be understood in 
social context, taking account of the everyday situatedness of sex as well as of wider socio-
cultural processes. Here we have drawn on a neglected tradition within social theory - 
interactionist sociology.  We have taken as our point of departure Gagnon and Simon’s 
pioneering work on sexuality, itself in part inspired by the early pragmatists (Gagnon 2004) 
among whom we have placed particular emphasis on GH Mead. Revisiting interactionism 
enables us to re-direct attention to the everyday sociality in which bodily encounters take place 
and in which embodied experiences are negotiated. In its emphasis on the mundane everyday  
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experiences and practices, symbolic interactionsim differs radically from traditions that 
emphasise the subversive power of desire and the destabilising potential of sexual transgression 
(see Gagnon 2004: 280). As Ken Plummer points out: 
 
…with the exception of some radically sexual transgressors, changes do not happen that 
easily or quickly. And the unstable, identity-less, utterly fractured sexual and gender 
identity seems to be largely a myth created by social science! (Plummer 2003: 525) 
 
We are not attempting to offer a total theorization of the body or of sexuality; rather we are 
suggesting that this approach can help us to understand aspects of sexual embodiment which 
have tended to fall between more abstract theorizations of the corporeal and empirical 
investigations of sexual conduct.16 In making interaction central, the articulation between the 
cultural, interpersonal and subjective aspects of sexual embodiment can be explored without 
assuming deterministic lines of causation, while at the same time locating sexuality securely 
within the social. Because embodied, sensory and sensate experience takes place within the 
social, it is simultaneously corporeal and meaningful, physical and symbolic. By working through 
the example of orgasm we have endeavoured to show that sexual desire and pleasure, while 
always embodied, equally always entail interpretive interactional processes. Human sexual 
embodiment can neither be thought of as an abstract potentiality outside the social spaces where 
it is lived, nor as a mere assemblage of organs, orifices and orgasms. 
 
                                      
1 As Atkinson and Housely note neo pragmatism has some currency in contemporary social theory the work of the 
early pragmatists such as James, Dewey, Mead and Cooley and the their influences on sociological as opposed to 
philosophical thought are less often recognized despite the fact that they speak to many current theoretical 
preoccupations with the fluidity of the social and questions of practice. 
2 This formulation derives from Dorothy Smith 1987. 
3 Recent accounts of social constructionism rest more on Foucauldian  foundations than on earlier sociological 
conceptualizations. Whereas Berger and Luckman, (1966) for example, asked how ‘human activity’ could ‘produce a 
world of things’, Foucault (1972) asks how discourse produces objects. 
4 This disappearance of the social is a more general theoretical tendency within which the cultural is made to stand 
in for the social, leaving out of consideration both everyday practices and the material conditions in which they are 
embedded. 
5 In endorsing Witz’s argument we are not engaging in sociological imperialism, but merely suggesting that particular 
forms of sociological understanding help to situate analyses of the body in the social relations of embodied 
interaction. 
6 A potentially shared sense of meaning because even in consensual heterosexual sex one partner may define 
interaction as erotic while the other might not, or may not invest it with the same form of eroticism what might be 
understood by one as an overpowering physical need might be seen by the other as romantic passion. 
7 The most influential form of biological determinism at present is evolutionary psychology, which dominates 
popular representations of both human and animal sexuality in the media.  
8 For a more detailed discussion of psychoanalysis see Jackson and Scott forthcoming 2007 
9 A recent example of this reading was offered by Simon Schama in his 2006 BBC 2 television series, The Power of 
Art.  There is also a long psychoanalytic tradition of reading Bernini’s sculpture in this way (see Macey 1988). This 
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understanding is part of a very Western and Christian tradition – there is a need for more cross-cultural analysis in 
order to understand the range of meaning given to desire and pleasure. We cannot assume that all cultures share 
Western ideas about the transcendent and mystical meanings of sex.  
10 Among the best known versions is the scene from the film When Harry met Sally, in which Sally demonstrates 
that orgasm can be convincingly faked. An earlier example is provided by the Jane Fonda in Barbarella; the scene 
with the ‘orgasmatron’, a machine for producing orgasms, also represents a highly sexual woman as autonomously 
erotic only with the aid of a machine. 
11 As Duncombe and Marsden (1996) point out, in long-term relationships women perform emotional work in sex 
in numerous ways, including pretending desire and acceding to unwanted sex.  
12 Only two of these dimensions appear in the first edition of Sexual Conduct (1974): the interpersonal and 
intrapsychic. The idea of cultural scripting or cultural scenarios arises from John Gagnon’s later work (see Gagnon 
2004) 
13 An example would be conventionalized sequences of petting behaviour among adolescents – in our youth British 
teenagers followed a 10 point scale while North Americans favoured a four-stage baseball analogy. 
14 This is a rather different conceptualisation of subjectivity from the psychoanalytic notion of the psyche. 
15 Gagnon and Simon discuss this in relation to the ways in which early adolescent feelings reported as ‘anxiety, 
nausea, fear’ later become re-recognized as sexual excitement (1974: 23). 
16 Although, as Plummer (2003) notes, symbolic interactionists have recently neglected the embodied aspect of 
sexual (and other) interaction, G.H. Mead himself did pay considerable attention to human beings as embodied 
organisms. 
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